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PRO/BMDO (ïðîäîëæåíèå)

milstar: Radar performance degrades in environments disturbed by nuclear explosions. ################################################### Hit- to-kill GBIs eliminate the nuclear weapon in the interceptor, but not that in the incoming RV, which could detonate on contact or command. ####################################### Neskolko yglow attaki ,na kazdom formazija/gruppirowka po 100 -1000 boegolowok W ochen' xoroschim/xoroschim chansom chast' iz nix budet podorwanna po prodwizeniju k rajonu attaki dlja degradazii/polnoj newozmoznosti funkzionirowanija rls PRO/BMD That would produce widespread ionospheric disturbances that could interrupt radar or infrared sensors for times longer than the attack. ################################# The US has no relevant data on nuclear phenomenology at relevant intercept altitudes. ####################################################### While x-band radars are less susceptible to nuclear blackout, the Achilles heel of Sentinel and Safeguard was random refraction from multiple bursts, for which there is no experimental evidence. ##################### Wopros s 35 ghz i 94 ghz RLS ,budut oni lutsche w dannoj situazii ? s ychetom wozmoznix plusow - ochen' yzkij luch ,dlja cassegran antenni 13.7 metra diametorom 0.014 grad dlja 94 ghz i 0.042 grad dlja 35 ghz i minusow - pri nizkix yglax bolschoe zatuxanie ot atmosferi ,w dozd' rsche xuze Megawatnnie lampi est' na oba diapazona pri depressed traektori wisota poleta mozet bit' 50-60 km pri elevazii 0 grad eto 800 km Y Warlok pri antenne 1.8 metra 94 ghz i impulsnoj moschnosti 100 kwt pri yglax elevazii 30 grad- 700 km pri 0 grad -70 km W 7 raz bolsche antenna = 49 po moschnosti i 10 po moschnsoti = 490.Koren' chetwertoj stepeni daet ywelichenie dalnosti w 4.7 raza Na 35 ghz werojatno lutsche(zatuxanie w atmosfere i ot dozdja mensche ) , no za schet ywelichanija lucha s 0.014 grad w 0.042 grad For attacks greater than a few weapons, this introduces a fundamental uncertainty into ######################################################## NMD. ### Gregory H. Canavan Los Alamos National Laboratory gcanavan@lanl.gov http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/1999/july/canavan-paper.html

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milstar: Firefly The Firefly is the most heavily instrumented inflatable target L'Garde has designed, tested and flown. It was built for Lincoln Laboratory's FIREFLY experiment. This was designed to test the ability of a 100 Joule LWIR laser beam for discriminating a decoy from a re-entry vehicle on the basis of decoy dynamics. The target was designed and built with different optical properties in the packaged and deployed states to aid in target acquisition and experiment, respectively. Target design and construction also accommodated observations in the L and X radar bands. The target had to eject with minimal tip-off, spin up to 3 Hz in the packaged state resulting in a 1 Hz spin rate in the deployed state through deliberate mass properties design. It went through a series of coning excursions, opening its precession angle from about 5 degrees to 20 degrees, then 40 and finally back to about 0, while conserving its initial angular momentum vector. The Firefly was instrumented to detect and change its state of motion through an on-board microprocessor and a L'Garde-developed light-weight coning control system; detect its absolute direction in space through a tri-axial magnetometer and a high-resolution sun sensor combination; keep track of all its status and housekeeping functions; and finally, process and telemeter 32 channels of data to both the bus following behind it and to the launch range below http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/targets.htm

milstar: Apr 8, 2011 By Jim Wolf/Reuters WASHINGTON The United States is preparing for its first test of a sea-based defense against longer-range missiles of a type that U.S. officials say could soon threaten Europe from Iran. Much is riding on the event, including confidence in the Obama administration’s tight timeline for defending European allies and U.S. forces deployed against the perceived Iranian threat. The last two intercept tests of a separate U.S. ground-based missile defense, aimed at protecting U.S. soil, have failed. The planned sea-based test this month will pit Lockheed Martin’s Aegis shipboard combat system and a Raytheon missile interceptor against their first intermediate-range ballistic missile target, said Richard Lehner, a spokesman for the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency. Previous sea-based drills have been against shorter-range targets. Intermediate range is defined as 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers (2,000-3,500 miles)—a distance that would put London, Paris and Berlin within range of Iran’s westernmost soil. The coming test is “to demonstrate a capability against a class of ballistic missiles, and is not country-specific,” Lehner said in an emailed reply to queries from Reuters. The layered, multibillion-dollar U.S. anti-missile effort also focuses on North Korea’s growing arsenal of missiles that, like Iran’s, could perhaps be tipped with chemical, biological or nuclear warheads. The “window” for the Aegis shootdown attempt runs to April 30, Lehner said. He said the Aegis-equipped ship used in the test will be in the south central Pacific and the ballistic missile target will be launched from Kwajalein Atoll, part of the Marshall Islands in the central Pacific. “During FTM-15, Aegis BMD (ballistic missile defense) will demonstrate for the first time its capability to negate the longer-range threats that must be countered in Phase 1” of the U.S.-planned bulwark for Europe, J. Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s top weapons tester, said in congressional testimony last month. Riki Ellison, head of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, a private booster group, described the test as a “proof of concept” for the Obama administration. It is tremendously important that it’s a success as this exact architecture is to be deployed in Europe by the end of this year in the first phase of Obama’s plan,” he said. Obama in 2009 scrapped a George W. Bush-era plan to build a European version, in the Czech Republic and Poland, of the ground-based shield already deployed in California and Alaska. Instead, his Pentagon turned to Aegis technology to better match its Iran expectations. On March 7, the Obama administration began deploying its so-called “Phased Adaptive Approach” to missile defense in Europe by sending the Aegis cruiser Monterey into the Mediterranean. The ship carries SM-3 Block 1A interceptors. As part of the Pentagon’s plan, the United States is seeking a southeastern European country to host a powerful Raytheon X-band radar station that would hand off data to the Aegis ships—a concept dubbed “launch on remote.” In the coming test, the interceptor missile will be cued by such an AN/TPY-2 radar unit, fed through a battle management center, just as is planned for Europe, Army Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly, the Missile Defense Agency chief, told the House of Representatives Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces on March 31. “The USS Monterey is at sea today and, when paired with the AN/TPY-2 radar, will provide initial BMD protection of southern Europe from existing SRBM, MRBM and IRBM threats,” he said, abbreviating for short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Greg Thielmann, a missile defense expert at the private Arms Control Association, discounted the likelihood of a near-term Iranian intermediate-range missile threat. “Any suggestion that a threat to the heart of Europe looms in the next couple of years does not seem consistent with public statements from the U.S. intelligence community,” he said. © 2011 Thomson Reuters. Click for Restrictions.

milstar: ...powerful Raytheon X-band radar station that would hand off data to the Aegis ships—a concept dubbed “launch on remote.” smotri wische w thread otchet Lincoln laboratory Aegis RLS 3100-3500 mgz wsepogodnaja ,no diskriminazija ballisticheskoj celi ploxaja THAAD w X band 8-12 ghz .Polosa signala wozmozna 1000 mgz (razr. sposobnost 250 mm) “The USS Monterey is at sea today and, when paired with the AN/TPY-2 radar, will provide initial BMD protection of southern Europe from existing SRBM, MRBM and IRBM threats,” he said, abbreviating for short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Eto ne znachit ,chto rossijskaya promischlennost dolzna skonzetrirowat ysilija na AFAR 8-10 ghz Est i drugie metodi ... a.RLS 35 ghz s polosoj signala 3500 mgz ( otechestwennie lampi denisiva w gycom mirowogo klassa ) b. Combinazija PFAR i cassegr antenn c. Combinazija diapazonow 10 ghz -35 ghz ,multipsektralnij analis


milstar: Awesome Aegis Ascendant October 4, 2009: The U.S. government, encouraged by the high success rate (83 percent) of U.S. Navy Aegis equipped ships using SM-3 missiles to shoot down ballistic missiles, has decided to expand the number of SM-3 equipped ships. Just this year, the navy completed equipping 18 ships with the Aegis anti-missile system, and that number may soon more than triple. This is part of a larger trend. Last year, the navy cancelled its expensive new DDG-1000 class of destroyers, partly because these ships were built to support amphibious and coastal operations, and did not have a radar that could easily be converted to use SM-3 anti-missile missiles. The DDG-1000 also cost 2-3 times more than Aegis destroyers. With missile defense seen as a higher priority than providing new amphibious and coastal combat capability, the DDG-1000 was killed, and the money saved could be used to build more Aegis destroyers, and convert more current destroyers and cruisers to use SM-3. With that in mind, the navy is already converting three more Aegis ships to fire anti-missile missiles. This costs about $12 million a ship, mainly for new software and a few new hardware items. This is seen as a safe investment. To knock down ballistic missile, Aegis uses two similar models of the U.S. Navy Standard anti-aircraft missile, in addition to a modified version of the Aegis radar system, tweaked to also track incoming ballistic missiles. Now the government wants to use Aegis more aggressively to block Iranian or North Korean ballistic missiles, and is proposing that nearly all (over 60) ships equipped with Aegis radar systems, be converted to fire SM-3 anti-missile missiles. This would mean buying over a thousand SM-3 missiles. These currently cost about $10 million each, and the next upgrade (which will deliver more accuracy and reliability) will raise that to $15 million each. ################################################################ While the expanded Aegis program will cost about $20 billion, it's seen as the cheapest way to provide reliable anti-missile defense against Iran and North Korea. The RIM-161A, also known as the Standard Missile 3 (or SM-3), has a range of over 500 kilometers and max altitude of over 160 kilometers. ############### The Standard 3 is based on the anti-missile version of the Standard 2 (SM-2 Block IV). This SM-2 missile turned out to be effective against ballistic missile warheads that are closer to their target. One test saw a SM-2 Block IV missile destroy a warhead that was only 19 kilometers up. An SM-3 missile can destroy a warhead that is more than 200 kilometers up. ########### w teste 2008 goda 240 km , modifizirowannaya raketa But the SM-3 is only good for anti-missile work, while the SM-2 Block IV can be used against both ballistic missiles and aircraft. w atmosfre KW ne obladajut effektivnostju ( rezko tormozjatsja ) The SM-2 Block IV also costs less than half what an SM-3 costs. The SM-3 has four stages. ################# The first two boost the interceptor out of the atmosphere. .. #################################### Linii Kaymana ? 118 km ? The third stage fires twice to boost the interceptor farther beyond the earth's atmosphere. ########################################################## Prior to each motor firing it takes a GPS reading to correct course for approaching the target. The fourth stage is the 20 pound LEAP kill vehicle, which uses infrared sensors to close on the target and ram it. ####################################################################### Wsego 9 kg ... esli boegolovka obldaet kakoj libo manewrennostyu ,to zapasa topliva net Yabch 1-1.15 kt wesit 15-17 kg + zapas topliva dlja manevra ... i wes protivoraketi werojatno budet stremitsja kwesu mini ICBM s zabrasiwaemoj massoj 60 kg na 8000-10000 km 4700 kg dwuxstupenchataja Persching w texnologii 1961 goda ,trexstupenchataja w sowremennoj texnologii zabrasiwaemaja massa werojatno budet bolsche ... The Aegis system was designed to operate aboard warships (cruisers and destroyers that have been equipped with the special software that enables the AEGIS radar system to detect and track incoming ballistic missiles). However, there is also a land based version that Israel is interested in buying.

milstar: http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/missiles/aegis/docs/SM-3KW.pdf On Feb. 20, 2008, during a real-world mission, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and the U.S. Navy intercepted and destroyed a non-functioning satellite with the Aegis SM-3 launched from the USS Lake Erie. The objective of the launch was to rupture the satellite’s fuel tank to dissipate about 1,000 pounds of hydrazine, a hazardous material which could pose a danger to people on earth, before it entered into earth's atmosphere. In July 2009, the Aegis SM-3 successfully intercepted a target marking the 15th successful intercept Contact: Linda James Weapons The Boeing Company 256-461-3101 linda.s.james@boeing.com April 2010

milstar: Navy Theater-Wide cannot be used to engage missiles with a range of about 400 kilometers or less traveling on standard trajectories, since those missiles never reach altitudes greater than 100 kilometers, below which LEAP cannot operate. (Recall that the target used in the NTW test was flown on a highly lofted trajectory.) [BR]http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/npp/unionofconcernedscienctistpaper3-3-02.pdf 13 For missiles with ranges greater than a few hundred kilometers, the atmospheric forces during reentry are very large, and can break the missile body off the warhead if it remains attached. When this happens, the force of the breakup and unpredictable atmospheric forces on ragged edges created by the breakup can cause the warhead to tumble and swerve significantly. Those missiles reentered the atmosphere at roughly 2 km/s. Since the atmospheric forces increase with the square of the missile’s speed, a Nodong missile with a speed of 3 km/s would be subject to forces more than twice as large as the al Hussein. The acceleration a required to move the aim point sideways by a distance d in a time t can be ****************************************************************************** found from the equation d = at2/2. This shows that to move the aim point by 3 meters in 0.1 seconds would require a *********************************************************************************************** lateral acceleration of about 60g, which is probably ten times the acceleration that LEAP is capable of (Ted Postol, ######################################################################### personal communication). KW wes orientirowochno 9 kg ***************************** The image of the Aries target vehicle from the LEAP sensors just before intercept. (US Navy photo) Figure 3: The closing speed between the target and interceptor in the test was roughly 4 km/s.11 (For comparison, the closing speed in the intercept tests of the ground-based midcourse missile defense system have been 7.4 km/s.) Given the speeds of the target and interceptor and the reported closing speed, we calculate that the interceptor and target collided at an angle of 107 degrees (i.e., 73 degree from head-on). ##################################### The SM-3 was a derivative of the Standard SM-2ER Block IV using the LEAP (Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile) homing vehicle to give AEGIS naval vessels theater anti-ballistic missile capability. The two rocket stages of the SM-2ER Block IV were supplemented by a third stage, the Alliant Techsystems Advanced Solid Axial Stage (ASAS). A GPS-Aided Inertial Navigation System was used to guide the missile to near the predicted impact point, with the LEAP making the final hit-to-kill intercept. AEGIS launching ships required updates to computer hardware and software in order to operate the missile. The LEAP and its Forward-Looking Infrared sensor were first tested in four Terrier/LEAP launches between 1992 to 1995. However both intercepts attempted in the series were failures. The first launch of a complete SM-3 missile came in September 1999. In January 2002 the first successful intercept of an Aries ballistic missile target was achieved. Testing thereafter proved the capability of the missile against more difficult targets and scenarios. In 2008 the system was modified in a matter of weeks to successfully shoot down an errant American satellite. Manufacturer: Raytheon. Launches: 17. Failures: 1. First Launch Date: 1999-09-24. Last Launch Date: 2007-12-17. Apogee: 160 km (90 mi). Liftoff Thrust: 0 N ( lbf). Total Mass: 1,500 kg (3,300 lb). Core Diameter: 0.53 m (1.73 ft). Total Length: 6.55 m (21.48 ft). Span: 1.57 m (5.15 ft). Maximum range: 500 km (310 mi). Standard warhead: LEAP. Boost Propulsion: Solid rocket. Boost engine: MK 72. Cruise Propulsion: Solid rocket. Cruise engine: MK 104. Stage 3 Engine: ASAS. Stage 3 Propellants: Solid rocket. Guidance: GPS + Inertial. Maximum speed: 9,600 kph (5,900 mph). Ceiling: 160,000 m (520,000 ft). Stage1: 1 x SM-2-IV-1. Gross Mass: 700 kg (1,540 lb). Empty Mass: 243 kg (535 lb). Motor: 1 x Mk 72. Length: 1.70 m (5.50 ft). Diameter: 0.53 m (1.73 ft). Propellants: Solid. Stage2: 1 x SM-3-2. Gross Mass: 500 kg (1,100 lb). Empty Mass: 128 kg (282 lb). Motor: 1 x Mk 104. Length: 2.90 m (9.50 ft). Diameter: 0.35 m (1.14 ft). Propellants: Solid. Stage3: 1 x SM-3-3. Gross Mass: 100 kg (220 lb). Motor: 1 x SM3 TSRM. Thrust (vac): 7.000 kN (1,574 lbf). Burn time: 15 sec. Length: 0.90 m (2.95 ft). Diameter: 0.33 m (1.08 ft). Propellants: Solid. http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/staarder.htm cena -wozmozno 10 mln $ za 1 No yskorenij 100 g tam net wozmozno ywelichenie kalibra do 533 mm w VLS MK57 ,dlini do 8 metrow dlja srawneninija malaja 9M83M 8.6 metra na 0.92 metra 3600 kg ,4 stuki na odnom tankowom chassi ************************************************************************************** bolschaja 9M82M 10 *1.25 metra ,6000 kg ,30 g ( tolko VV wesit 150 kg ,a esli 15 kg yabch ,to yskorenija mogut bitr bolschimi chem 30 g)

milstar: remote RLS THAAD w Polsche ,perexwatchiki sm-3 w more ------------------------------------------------------------------- W Rossii toze vozmozni poodbnie versii http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9xupOQSvnas&feature=related Kak dlja KR ,tak i Mini ICBM , ASAT ,BMDO/PRO

milstar: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/images/sm-3-image27.jpg wse nowejschie varianti SM-3 diametrom 533 mm po wsej dline ( 3 stupeni + RGSN ) http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms01_055769.pdf

milstar: http://www.mda.mil/news/gallery_aegis.html http://www.mda.mil/global/videos/aegis/jftm4.wmv 2010 Aegis Videos Oct. 29, 2010 - A Standard Missile – 3 (SM-3) is launched from the Japanese Ship (JS) KIRISHIMA (DDG-174) in a joint missile defense intercept test with the Missile Defense Agency, in the mid-Pacific. The SM-3 successfully intercepted a separating 1,000 km class ballistic missile target that had been launched minutes earlier from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. The KIRISHIMA’s crew detected and tracked the target and its weapons system developed a fire control solution. The crew then launched the SM-3, with the intercept occurring three minutes later.

milstar: http://glasstone.blogspot.com/2006/03/emp-radiation-from-nuclear-space.html smotri test SSSR 22 oktjabrja 1962 goda na wisote 290 km 300 kt RLS ne rabotosposbni na distanzii 1000 km

milstar: 0800067 - High-Altitude Nuclear Weapon Effects Part Two - Systems Interference - 1963 - 16:29 - Color - Through past nuclear testing, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission determined that a nuclear weapon exploded at high altitude with a sufficient yield would cause adverse effects on communication and radar devices. This technically oriented video, which uses many animated audio-visual aids to explain scientific points of interest and explores the weapons effects on military systems. The first portion deals with a hypothetical reentry vehicle armed with a nuclear warhead. The video explains how three different nuclear detonations might be required to track and destroy the incoming vehicle. The next portion explains how a nuclear explosion would more adversely affect the low-power downlink of radio transmissions to aircraft or satellites than the more powerful uplink. Other atmospheric chemistry and infrared systems problems are discussed in the video. [BR]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T6eLPLR_WPs 0800066 - High-Altitude Nuclear Weapon Effects Part One - Phenomenology - 1963 - 20:53 - Color - When nuclear weapons are detonated at high altitudes, they cause dramatic changes in the atmosphere and ionosphere. In a very technical presentation, this video discusses such things as the interactions of electrons and positive ions and shows the electromagnetic regions and how they carry electrical charges from one hemisphere to another. The video also discusses how there is much information unknown about nuclear explosions at extremely high altitudes, especially above 250 kilometers, where there is less atmospheric resistance. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tdrirktDT2Y&feature=related

milstar: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997_h/h970716u.htm Statement of Dr. George W. Ullrich Deputy Director Defense Special Weapons Agency INTRODUCTION Mr. Chairman, I am Dr. George Ullrich, the Deputy Director at the Defense Special Weapons Agency in the Department of Defense. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss this important issue. It is interesting to note that exactly 52 years ago to the day, the world's first nuclear device was exploded at Trinity site, located on an isolated stretch of New Mexico desert in what is now the White Sands Missile Range. Among the team who witnessed that momentous event was Enrico Fermi, nobel laureate and perhaps the most brilliant of the Manhattan Project physicists. It was said that he was probably the last man of the twentieth century who actually knew all of the physics of his day. I mention it because it was Enrico Fermi who, prior to the Trinity Event, first predicted that nuclear explosions were capable of generating strong electromagnetic fields. Since then we have learned a great deal more about nuclear-induced electromagnetic phenomena and, in particular, about the phenomenon of high altitude Electro-Magnetic Pulse, commonly called "EMP." The most common perception of a nuclear detonation is that represented by a mushroom cloud -- a burst at or near the surface of the earth. Such a burst results in a variety of weapons effects, most prominently blast and thermal, whose extent can reach up to several miles from ground zero, depending on yield. The only exception is radioactive fallout from a surface burst, which at low levels can traverse the entire globe. A high altitude burst, detonated at heights ranging from 50 to several hundreds of kilometers above the earth's surface, is also capable of generating a wide variety of effects and disturbed environments, the most far-reaching being EMP. Depending primarily on the burst height and to a lesser extent on yield, a high altitude burst can bathe a continental size region in EMP. Such a detonation causes particular concern because of the sensitivity of modern electronics to strong electromagnetic fields. A knowledgeable adversary could attempt to exploit such a perceived weakness, thereby severely degrading the U.S. technological advantage, and he could do so in a way that would not likely provoke an immediate nuclear retaliation A less well known effect of high altitude bursts, but also one with potentially devastating consequences, is the artificial "pumping" of the Van Allen belt with large numbers of electrons. The bomb-induced electrons will remain trapped in these belts for periods exceeding one year. All unhardened satellites traversing these belts in low earth orbit could demise in a matter of days to weeks following even one high altitude burst. The United States' national military strategy is based, in significant part, on our technological advantages in such fields as electronics and computers. These are the enabling technologies for achieving Information Dominance, which contributed to our success in the Gulf War and will be vital on future battlefields. As outlined in A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, May 1997, our national military strategy also emphasizes the importance of responding to asymmetries -- that is, unconventional approaches that avoid or undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities. To quote from the report, "Because of our dominance in the conventional military arena, adversaries who challenge the United States are likely to do so using asymmetric means...such as WMD..." To preserve our technological advantage, DoD develops radiation hardened systems and tests them to assure survivability. However, due to size and power reductions, modern electronics are inherently more vulnerable to some of the effects produced by a nuclear detonation. And each new generation, smaller and needing less power, exacerbates these vulnerabilities. Furthermore, as we make greater use of more affordable commercial parts and components, we potentially introduce new vulnerabilities into our military systems. Additionally, the military's increasing reliance on commercial space-based systems makes it more vulnerable to the nuclear weapon effects being discussed. In my presentation today, I will provide a brief overview of the effects produced by nuclear weapons, to include lessons learned during both the United States' and Soviet Union's atmospheric nuclear test programs. Particular emphasis will be given to the most significant effects in a scenario in which an adversary uses one or a few nuclear weapons detonated at a high altitude. I will discuss what we have learned about providing affordable protection. Finally, I will mention what we do to simulate these threat level environments and how we perform testing to validate EMP hardness. I should also note that the programs I will discuss are components within a broader set of Defense Department activities directed at sustainment of critical DoD nuclear mission competencies. These activities are described in detail in -- the May 1997 report by the Secretary of Defense on Nuclear Weapon Systems Sustainment Programs previously delivered to the Committee. HIGH ALTITUDE NUCLEAR DETONATION EFFECTS Based on over a half-century of research, we have developed an understanding of the effects produced by nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, we have added to our knowledge based on an analysis of information made available from the Soviet Unionís nuclear test programs. To understand the military consequences that can result from the high altitude detonation of even a single nuclear weapon, I will address: * High Altitude EMP (or HEMP) * System Generated EMP (SGEMP) and * other Radiation Effects. In keeping with your request, Mr. Chairman, I will direct most of my remarks to the topic of high altitude EMP. High Altitude EMP A nuclear weapon detonated at high altitude releases some of its energy in the form of gamma rays. These gamma rays collide with air molecules and produce what are called Compton electrons. The Compton electrons, in turn, interact with the earth's magnetic field, producing an intense electromagnetic pulse that propagates downward to the earth's surface. The initial gamma rays and resultant EMP move with the speed of light. The effects encompass an area along the line of sight from the detonation to the earth's horizon. Any system within view of the detonation will experience some level of EMP. For example, if a high-yield weapon were to be detonated 400 kilometers (250 miles) above the United States, nearly the entire contiguous 48 states would be within the line-of-sight. The frequency range of the pulse is enormously wide -- from below one hertz to one gigahertz. Peak electric fields can reach tens of thousands of volts per meter. All types of modern electronics are potentially at risk, from Boston to Los Angeles; from Chicago to New Orleans. One of our earliest experiences with HEMP dates back to the resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing in 1962 following a three year testing moratorium. Starfish Prime, a 1.4 megaton device, was detonated at an altitude of 400 kilometers over Johnston Island. Failures of electronic systems resulted in Hawaii, 1,300 kilometers away from the detonation. Street lights and fuzes failed on Oahu and telephone service was disrupted on the island of Kauai. Subsequent tests with lower yield devices produced electronic upsets on an instrumentation aircraft that was approximately 300 kilometers away from the detonations. Soviet scientists had similar experiences during their atmospheric test program. In one test, all protective devices in overhead communications lines were damaged at distances out to 500 kilometers; the same event saw a 1,000 kilometer segment of power line shut down by these effects. Failures in transmission lines, breakdowns of power supplies, and communications outages were wide-spread. System Generated EMP When gamma and x-rays from a high altitude detonation encounter a satellite in space they excite and release electrons as they penetrate the interior of the system. This phenomena is referred to as system generated electromagnetic pulse (SGEMP) because the accelerated electrons create electromagnetic transients. Systems must be configured with special cables, aperture protection, grounding, and insulating materials in order to survive these transients. SGEMP impacts space system electronics in three ways. First, x-rays arriving at the spacecraft skin cause an accumulation of electrons there. The electron charge, which is not uniformly distributed on the skin, causes current to flow on the outside of the system. These currents can penetrate into the interior through various apertures, as well as into and through the solar cell power transmission system. Secondly, x-rays can also penetrate the skin to produce electrons on the interior walls of the various compartments. The resulting interior electron currents generate cavity electromagnetic fields that induce voltages on the associated electronics which produce spurious currents that can cause upset or burnout of these systems. Finally, x-rays can produce electrons that find their way directly into signal and power cables to cause extraneous cable currents. These currents are also propagated through the satellite wiring harness. Other Radiation Effects A high-altitude detonation presents a double radiation threat to space based assets. Systems not protected by the Earth's shadow are exposed to the direct weapon outputs (gamma rays, x-rays, neutrons) and can be upset or damaged immediately if their range from the weapon is such that the radiation environments exceed electronic device tolerance levels. The second threat comes from the weapon-produced electrons that enhance the earth's natural Van Allen radiation belts. Satellites that repeatedly transit these enhanced radiation belts in their orbits will eventually exceed their total radiation dose tolerance and will degrade, then fail. Weapon debris carries a significant percentage of the energy of the detonation and this radioactive material releases enormous numbers of high energy electrons through beta decay. This phenomena creates an artificial "trapped electron" radiation belt. The size and intensity of the belt is highly dependent on the yield, altitude, and latitude of the detonation. The energies of the weapon-induced trapped electrons are significantly higher than those of the natural environment. For example, a 50 kiloton (KT) weapon detonated at a 120 km altitude (75 miles) can produce electron densities several orders of magnitude higher than the natural electron environment in low earth orbit. These elevated electron densities can last for months to years and significantly increase the total ionizing dose accumulated by space assets that transit these belts. This increase in total dose accumulation can dramatically shorten the lifetime of satellite systems. Projected lifetimes of up to ten years can be reduced to a mere two months after such an event. AFFORDABLE HEMP PROTECTION We understand how to provide effective protection against EMP effects. The basic approach is to provide a shield that prevents damaging electrical pulses from entering a system. This requires protection at all electrical and mechanical penetrations. EMP hardening protocols have been published in standard handbooks and computer programs have been developed to facilitate system hardness designs. EMP protection is also affordable. If accomplished during the design phase, the cost of EMP protection is a small fraction, one-to-five-percent, of overall system development costs. Done after the fact, when the unprotected system has already been fielded, it can be significantly more expensive. To contribute to cost savings, we have an effort underway to develop integrated hardening methodologies that provide protection against multiple hazards. Our initial work focuses on integrated protection against the effects of both high altitude EMP and high powered microwaves produced with non-nuclear sources. SIMULATION TO VALIDATE HEMP PROTECTION We acquired much of our understanding of high altitude EMP effects and the protection needed from the development and effective use of nuclear weapon effects simulators. DoD currently operates a suite of simulators that provides the needed capabilities for large area, threat-level field illumination, direct current injection techniques, and low-level, continuous wave (CW) illumination to evaluate shield integrity and energy coupling efficiencies. These simulators are used in combination to validate a system's overall EMP protection. STATE OF UNDERSTANDING High Altitude EMP, System Generated EMP, and Radiation Effects are genuine, widespread hazards produced by even one nuclear weapon. We know how to protect against these EMP and radiation threats. Such protection is affordable, if provided for at an early stage in system design and development. For a tactical system, the cost can be as little as 1% of the total development investment; for strategic systems, a target of 5% is reasonable. Retrofitting protection after a system has been deployed can be considerably more expensive. The pace of new developments in the fields of electronics and computers can be daunting. There is a new generation of microelectronics technology every eighteen months. Some of these new technologies are inherently more susceptible to nuclear threats. DoD has recognized and responded to these and other challenges. As outlined in the Secretaryís May 1997 report on Nuclear Weapon Systems Sustainment Programs, additional funds have been programmed to ensure that core DoD requirements for advanced radiation hardened microelectronics technology are met. More recently, a Radiation Hard Oversight Council was established to ensure these efforts have appropriate visibility and oversight. EMP does not distinguish between military and civilian systems. Unhardended systems, such as commercial power grids, telecommunications networks, and computing systems, remain vulnerable to widespread outages and upsets due to HEMP. While DoD hardens assets it deems vital, no comparable civil program exists. Thus, the detonation of one or a few high-altitude nuclear weapons could result in devastating problems for the entire U.S. commercial infrastructure. Some detailed network analyses of critical civil systems would be useful to better understand the magnitude of the problem and define possible solution paths.

milstar: The ABM version of the UR-100 missile was to be equipped with a super-powerful nuclear charge of at least 10 megatons. According to primary estimates of the Research Institute of Academician Keldysh, for killing of 100 Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles it was necessary to launch up to 200 ABMs of the Taran system. Na kakoj wisote ,na kakuju distanziju oni bili effektivni ? Za schet kakogo effekta ? Wzrivnioj wolni ? W kosmose atmosferi "pochti" net Linija Kaymana - gde moschnost pri ispolzowanii ispolzowanii aerodinamicheskix i ballisticheskix sil -118 km http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/soviet/990600-bmd-rus.htm Gamma izluchenija ?

milstar: ABM-1 Galosh 2-3 megatonni na wisote 120 km (Linija Kaymana) Neobxodimost takoj moschnosti ? a. Mala tochnost b. Nizkaya plotnost atmosferi c. punkt a i punkt b wmeste http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galosh_%28missile%29

milstar: The main missile was LIM-49 Spartan—a Nike Zeus upgraded for longer range and a much larger 5 megatonne warhead intended to destroy enemy's warheads with a burst of x-rays outside the atmosphere. ######################################## http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-ballistic_missile http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LIM-49_Spartan wisota do 560 km ... T.e. na dannoj wisote 5 mt dejstwujut na distanziju X ?

milstar: Ochen xoroschij wopros 8 Yabch letjat w gruppe ... podriw odnoj -wisokaya ionizacija atmosferi na neskolko sot km ######################################################### Budet rabotosposben IR datchik protivoraketi SM-3 s kineticheskim oruziem ? On dolzen obespechit ochen wisokuju tochnost (prjamoe popadanie)

milstar: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/gbi-ekv.htm The EKV weighs approximately 140 pounds, is 55 inches in length and approximately 24 inches in diameter. By another account, it is approximately 52 inches in length, 24 inches in diameter and weighs approximately 120 lbs. The Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle is supposed to fly through space at 4500 miles an hour and smash into an incoming warhead. The EKV seeker is composed of focal plane arrays and a cryogenic cooling assembly attached to an optical telescope, supported by hardware and software processing. The EKV will use an on-board navigation and target selection systems to locate the target, and destroy it. The exoatmospheric kill vehicle was the weapon component of the GMD interceptor that attempts to detect and destroy the threat reentry vehicle through a hit-to-kill impact. The prime contractor identified three critical technologies pertaining to the operation of the exoatmospheric kill vehicle. Infrared seeker, which is the “eyes” of the kill vehicle. The seeker is designed to support kill vehicle functions like tracking and target discrimination. The primary subcomponents of the seeker are the infrared sensors, a telescope, and the cryostat that cools down the sensors. On-board discrimination, which is needed to identify the true warhead from among decoys and associated objects. Discrimination is a critical function of the hit-to-kill mission that requires the successful execution of a sequence of functions, including target detection, target tracking, and the estimation of object features. As such, successful operation of the infrared seeker is a prerequisite for discrimination.

milstar: Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) Country: USA Basing: Land In Service: 2004 Details The Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) is a multi-stage silo-launched booster rocket and kill vehicle that will track and destroy high-speed ballistic missiles in their midcourse phase, i.e. while the missiles are still outside the atmosphere and at their highest trajectory. Once operational, the GBI will be a critical part of the Missile Defense Agency’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which is scheduled for deployment in September 2004. Although MDA developed many of GMD’s technologies during the 1980s and 1990s, the project officially began in 1998 with a $1.6 billion dollar initial contract to Boeing. Subcontractors include Orbital Sciences Corporation, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon. Boeing is in charge of GBI’s development, and the project is currently undergoing extensive ground and flight tests. As currently envisioned, each GBI missile will consist of two main components: a three-stage booster rocket and the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). MDA currently has two separate booster rockets in the works: Orbital Sciences Corporation is building the Orbital Boost Vehicle (OBV), while Lockheed Martin is designing the Boost Vehicle Plus (BV-Plus). The OBV can fly at 3.7 miles per second; the BV-Plus maxes out at 3.4 miles per second. MDA believes that deploying a variety of booster rockets will strengthen the overall GMD system. According to Army Major General John W. Holly, Director of GMD, “If you can match the right weapon with the target that you are going after, . . . you are much more efficient in your engagement.” On top of either the OBV or the BV-Plus will sit Raytheon’s Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle. The EKV is designed to track and destroy ballistic missiles outside the Earth’s atmosphere, hence its “exoatmospheric” nature. Each kill vehicle costs between $20 and $25 million and will include a range of sophisticated devices: infrared sensors, an internal navigational system, antennas, thruster engines, a cryogenic cooling system, and a small computer, all designed to maximize the probability of a successful “kill.” Yet even with all its components, the entire EKV will fit comfortably on a kitchen table. It is only 55 inches long, 24 inches in diameter, and weighs 140 pounds. Once deployed, the GBI interceptors will be located in underground silos and will be connected to a web of satellites and radars that will continuously scan the entire globe for threats. In the event that an enemy missile is detected, the GMD command center will relay its launch command, and the designated GBI missile will blast out of its silo and climb toward the target’s predicted location, receiving in-flight tracking updates from the satellites and radars along the way. As it streaks through its three boost stages, the GBI will gain speed. Three minutes into its flight (approximately 1,400 miles from its target), the EKV will separate from the third-stage booster rocket. Dozens of cables will be blown off, and four springs will propel the small payload forward. The EKV will immediately bank sharply to either the right or the left to avoid being hit from behind by the booster rocket. From this point forward, the kill vehicle will proceed to the target on its own momentum. As the EKV closes in, the combined velocity of the kill vehicle and the incoming missile will approach 15,000 miles per hour (four miles per second, or five times the speed of a bullet), leaving little room for last minute maneuvers. Approximately 100 seconds before impact, the EKV’s infrared sensors will switch on and begin tracking the incoming ballistic missile. To achieve complete threat neutralization, the EKV will collide with the warhead’s “sweet spot,” an area just a few centimeters wide where the missile’s payload is located. The impact from a precise hit will pulverize the warhead and destroy any nuclear, chemical, or biological agents it might be carrying. Since 1999, MDA has conducted seven hit-to-kill tests. Five have been successful. The most recent was on October 14, 2002, when a GBI from the Reagan Test Site in the central Pacific Ocean tracked and destroyed a target vehicle launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California at an altitude of 140 miles and a closing speed in excess of 15,000 miles per hour. MDA plans to perform approximately 17 more hit-to-kill intercepts over the next several years. Due to these successes, the GBI program has received enthusiastic support from the Bush Administration and the Republican-controlled Congress. MDA is currently installing six GBI missiles at Fort Greely in Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base Over 20 interceptors are scheduled for deployment over the next two years. http://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.23/system_detail.asp

milstar: W rassekrechenom filme http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T6eLPLR_WPs s 0.40 3 boegolovki na odnoj linii 1. Perexwat na wisote 250 km Max Ydalenie sootw 1785 km ( po linii gorizonta ) Min 250 km -cel nad RLS 2. na wisote 100 km Max Ydalenie 1129 km 3. na wisote 20 km Max Ydalenie 505 km Wlijanie ionizacii na degradaziju radara W filme gde to mezdu min i max ...( 30 ° -45° ygolw mesta ?) Sootw mozno pereschitat

milstar: pri ygle mesta 30 ° wisote wzriwa 250 km ,distanzija do celi -475 km



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